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Distributed generation and remotely controlled switches have emerged as important technologies to improve
the resiliency of distribution grids against extreme weather-related disturbances. Therefore it becomes impor-
tant to study how best to place them on the grid in order to meet a resiliency criteria, while minimizing costs
and capturing their dependencies on the associated communication systems that sustains their distributed
operations. This paper introduces the Optimal Resilient Design Problem for Distribution and Communi-
cation Systems (ORDPDC) to address this need. The ORDPDC is formulated as a two-stage stochastic
mixed-integer program that captures the physical laws of distribution systems, the communication connec-
tivity of the smart grid components, and a set of scenarios which specifies which components are affected
by potential disasters. The paper proposes an exact branch-and-price algorithm for the ORDPDC which
features a strong lower bound and a variety of acceleration schemes to address degeneracy. The ORDPDC
model and branch-and-price algorithm were evaluated on a variety of test cases with varying disaster inten-
sities and network topologies. The results demonstrate the significant impact of the network topologies on
the expansion plans and costs, as well as the computational benefits of the proposed approach.
Key words : Planning for Resiliency, Power Systems, Branch and Price
1. Introduction
The last decades have highlighted the vulnerability of the current electric power system
to weather-related extreme events. Between 2007 and 2016, outages caused by natural
hazards, such as thunderstorms, tornadoes, and hurricanes, amounted to 90 percent of
major electric disturbances, each affecting at least 50,000 customers (derived from Form
OE-417 of U.S. DOE). It is also estimated that 90 percent of all outages occur along
distribution systems (Executive Office of the President 2013). Moreover, the number of
weather-related outages is expected to rise as climate change increases the frequency and
intensity of extreme weather events (Executive Office of the President 2013). Accordingly,
it is critical to understand how to harden and modernize distribution grids to prepare for
potential natural disasters.
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Distributed Generation (DG) is one of the advanced technologies that can be utilized
to enhance grid resilience. DG refers to electric power generation and storage performed
by a collection of distributed energy resources (DER). DG decentralizes the electric power
distribution by supplying power to the loads closer to where it is located. The poten-
tial of DGs is realized via a system approach that views DGs and associated loads as a
microgrid (Lasseter et al. 2002). A microgrid is often defined as a small-scale power sys-
tem on medium- or low- voltage distribution feeder that includes loads and DG units,
together with an appropriate management and control scheme supported by a communi-
cation infrastructure (Resende et al. 2011). When faults occur in the main grid, microgrids
can be detached from the main grid and act in island mode to serve critical loads by
utilizing local DGs or work in the grid-connected mode to provide ancillary services for
the bulk system restoration (Wang et al. 2016a). Remotely controlled switches (RCS),
another advanced technology, can be used to increase the grid flexibility by controlling
the grid topology through a communication network and facilitate microgrid formations
in emergencies. Other than the aforementioned operational enhancement measures, a grid
can also be hardened physically by installing underground cables and/or upgrading the
overhead lines with stronger materials, which reduces the physical impact of catastrophic
events (Panteli et al. 2017).
A critical issue in building resilient distribution grids is to determine where to place such
advanced devices (i.e., DGs, RCSs, and underground cables) and which existing lines to
harden. It is also important to understand the dependency between the distribution grid
and its associated communication network, which is critical to the effective operation of
a modernized grid during emergency situations and is also vulnerable to extreme events
(Falahati et al. 2012, Gholami et al. 2016, Martins et al. 2017, Li et al. 2017).
To address this pivotal and pressing issue, this paper introduces the Optimal Resilient
Design Problem for Distribution and Communication Systems (ORPDDC). The ORDPDC
determines how to harden and modernize an interdependent network to ensure its resilience
against extreme weather events. Like recent papers (e.g., Yamangil et al. (2015), Barnes
et al. (2017), the ORDPDC takes into account a set of disaster scenarios, each defining
a set of power system components that are damaged during an extreme event. These
scenarios are generated from historical data or probabilistic models of how power system
components respond to hazard-specific stress (e.g., wind speed and flood depth). The
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ORDPDC considers the following upgrade options: a set of hardening options on existing
power lines and communication links and a set of new components that can be added to
the system—new lines, new communication pathways, remotely controlled switches, and
distributed generation. The objective of the ORDPDC is to find the cheapest set of upgrade
options that can be placed on the grid in order to guarantee that a minimal amount of
critical and non-critical load be served in each scenario. These guarantees are called the
reslience criteria.
The ORDPDC is modeled with a two-stage stochastic mixed integer program. The first
stage decides an upgrade profile and the second stage decides how to utilize the DGs, RCSs,
and power lines/communication links, whose availability is decided in the first-stage, to
restore critical loads up to resiliency criteria (e.g., 98 %) in each disaster scenario. For each
scenario, the second stage is viewed as a restoration model that identifies how to reconfigure
the grid. Within this second stage problem, the physics of power flows is modeled with the
steady-state, unbalanced three phase AC power equations and constraints that ensure that
the radial structure of distribution grids is maintained. When the grid is reconfigured due
to some disturbances, each island or microgrid must be connected to at least one control
center that coordinates its DGs and loads and operates its RCSs. This communication
requirement is modeled with a single-commodity flow model.
Several solution methods can be used to solve the ORDPDC, taking advantage of its
block diagonal structure. Yamangil et al. (2015) proposed a Scenario-Based Decomposition
(SBD) that restricts attention to a smaller set of scenarios and adds new ones on an
as needed basis (see Section 5). However, in the worst case, SBD must solve the large-
scale ORDPDC as a whole. Branch and Price (B&P), which combines column generation
and branch-and-bound, is another solution method for approaching large-scale mixed-
integer programming (Lu¨bbecke and Desrosiers 2005). Although widely successful on many
applications, it may suffer from degeneracy and long-tail effects as problems become larger.
To address these difficulties, several stabilization techniques have been proposed and proven
to be effective in many applications (e.g., (Du Merle et al. 1999, Oukil et al. 2007, Amor
et al. 2009)). Nevertheless, the high degree of degeneracy and the significant scale of the
ORDPDC create significant challenges for dual stabilization techniques.
To address these computational challenges, this paper proposes a B&P algorithm that
systematically exploits the structure of the ORDPDC. The algorithm starts with a compact
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reformulation that results in strong lower bounds on the test cases and pricing subproblems
that are naturally solved in parallel. Moreover, the B&P algorithm tackles the degener-
acy inherent in the ORDPDC through a variety of acceleration schemes for the pricing
subproblems: A pessimistic reduced cost, an optimality cut, and a lexicographic objective.
The resulting B&P algorithm produces significant computational improvements compared
to existing approaches.
The key contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• The paper proposes the first planning model for resilient distribution networks that
combines the use of advanced technologies (e.g., DGs, RCSs, and undergrounding) with
traditional hardening options and captures the dependencies between the distribution grid
and its associated communication system.
• The paper proposes an exact B&P algorithm for solving the ORDPDC problem, which
systematically exploits the ORDPDC structure to obtain strong lower bounds and address
its significant degeneracy issues.
• The paper evaluates the impact of grid and communication system topologies on
potential expansion plans. It also reports extensive computational results demonstrating
the benefits of the proposed B&P algorithm on the test cases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work on
the ORDPDC. Section 3 formalizes the ORDPDC and Section 4 presents a tight linear
approximation. Section 5 briefly reviews the SBD algorithm. Section 6 presents the new
B&P algorithm. Section 7 describes the test cases. Lastly, Section 8 analyzes the behavior
of the model on the case studies and Section 9 reports on the computational performance
of the proposed algorithm. Section 10 concludes the paper.
2. Literature Review
There has been a considerable progress in advancing methods that address weather-related
issues at distribution level (Wang et al. 2016a). Many studies develop post-fault distribution
system restoration (DSR) models to bring power back as soon as possible and restore
critical loads after a severe outage. Recently, DGs, RCSs, and redundant lines were utilized
to leverage microgrids in load restoration. Most of the studies assume the existence of those
devices beforehand (Chen et al. 2016, Ding et al. 2017, Gao et al. 2016, Yuan et al. 2017).
Wang et al. (2016b) proposed a DSR model that utilizes the placement of dispatchable
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DGs. The above-mentioned studies however propose post-contingency models. To facilitate
these novel restoration methods, the devices should be placed in suitable places in advance.
This paper focuses on the optimal placement of those devices so that the grid survives
potential weather-related events.
Only a limited number of studies have discussed how to optimally add resilience to
distribution networks. Most relevant is the work by Barnes et al. (2017) and Yamangil et al.
(2015) who propose multi-scenario models for making a distribution grid resilient with
respect to a set of potential disaster scenarios. They propose decomposition-based exact
and heuristic solution approaches. However, theses studies do not consider some of the
upgrade options discussed in this paper, and communication networks are not taken into
account. Yuan et al. (2016) proposed a two-stage robust optimization model by utilizing a
bi-level network interdiction model that identifies the critical components to upgrade for
the resilience against the N −K contingency criterion. However, as pointed out in Barnes
et al. (2017), in practice, the computational complexity of this approach grows quickly with
the number of allowable faults. The study also did not explicitly consider the dependency
on the communication network: A DG can supply power to the node it is placed on and
its children if they are not damaged by the attack. Carvalho et al. (2005) and Xu et al.
(2016) discuss how to place RCSs in distribution systems, but only single fault scenarios
are assumed, which is not suitable for capturing weather-related extreme events.
As the instrumentation of the grid increases, frameworks for modeling its dependence
on communication networks from a resilience viewpoint have been studied (Martins et al.
2017, Parhizi et al. 2015). Resende et al. (2011) proposed a hierarchical control system,
which assumes the existence of a controller in each microgrid to allow for the coordina-
tion among distributed generation units in the microgrid, while multiple microgrids are
organized by a central management controller. On the other hand, distributed control sys-
tems are applied to microgrids where there are many devices with their own controllers.
Accordingly, Chen et al. (2016) assumed that RCSs have local communication capabilities
to exchange information with neighboring switches over short-range low-cost wireless net-
works and proposed a global information discovery scheme to get the input parameters for
a DSR model. However, the assumption that RCSs are installed in all lines is premature for
current distribution systems. Wang et al. (2016b) proposed a two-layered communication
framework where the lower-layer cyber network supports microgrids where local control
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systems are installed, while the upper-layer network is composed of multiple local control
systems that only communicate with their neighboring counterparts. The study can be
viewed as a hybrid of centralized and decentralized framework: At a microgrid level, it is
operated in a centralized fashion, while the upper-level network is operated in a decen-
tralized manner. However, it did not consider fault scenarios in communication networks.
This paper only assumes the lower-layer cyber network proposed in Wang et al. (2016b)
by dynamically allocating a local control system to each microgrid in islanding mode.
Moreover, this paper also considers potential faults in the communication system.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper proposes, for the first time, an exact optimiza-
tion algorithm for expanding an integrated distribution grid and communication network
through the placement of new DGs and RCSs and the hardening of existing lines in order
to ensure resilience against a collection of disaster scenarios.
3. The ORDPDC
The ORDPDC considers an unbalanced three-phase distribution grid coupled with a com-
munication network, as illustrated in Figure 1. In the figure, blue- and red-colored arrows
represent regular and critical loads. Nodes in the communication networks may control a
generator or a switch in the distribution network, as indicated by dotted lines. The figure
also highlights how the line phases are interconnected at the buses and the communication
centers that will send instructions to generators and switches remotely.
LetG= (V,E) be an undirected graph that represents a distribution grid and its available
upgrade options: V and E denote the set of buses and the set of distribution lines. The
communication network, along with its potential upgrade options, is represented by a
undirected graph G˜= (N˜ , E˜), where N˜ and E˜ are the set of communication nodes and a set
of communication links. A communication node is either a control point or an intermediate
point. Each control point is associated with some device in G and some nodes in N˜ are
designated as control centers.
The power grid G depends on its communication network G˜ in the following way: A
device in G (e.g., a generator or a RCSs) is operable only when its associated control point
can receive a signal from some control center in G˜. This modeling enables islands to form
and to be operated independently only when at least one control center can communicate
to the island and, in particular, its generator(s).
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Figure 1 The Cyber-Physical Network for Electricity Distribution. Solid lines represent power lines and dotted
lines represent communication links.
Let G = (N ,E) be the integrated system of G and G˜ with N =N ∪ N˜ and E =E ∪ E˜.
Let D be a set of damage scenarios for G indexed with S := {1, · · · , |D|}. Each scenario
s∈ S is a set of edges of E that are damaged under s. The goal of the ORDPDC is to find
an optimal upgrade profile for the cyber-physical system G that is resilient with respect to
the damage scenarios in D. The upgrade options include a) the building of new edges in
E (i.e., distribution lines or communication links); b) the building of RCSs on some lines
in E to provide operational flexibility; c) the hardening of existing edges in E to lower the
probability of damage, and d) the building of DGs at some buses of the grid.
The ORDPDC is a two-stage mixed integer stochastic program. The first-stage variables
represent potential infrastructure enhancements for the coupled network G and the second-
stage variables capture how upgrades serve the loads in each disaster scenario.
3.1. Mathematical Formulation
Table 1 specifies the input data for the ORDPDC problem, while Table 2 describes the
model variables. The formulation assumes that all new lines come with switches (i.e.,
Enx ⊆E0t ) which reflects current industry practice. Throughout this paper, an edge e∈ E is
represented as an ordered pair (eh, et) for some eh, et ∈N and δ(e) = {eh, et}. The set of all
edges incident to a node i∈N is denoted by δ(i). The notation xA represents the projection
of a vector x to the space of some index set A, i.e., (xa)a∈A: For instance, xsEx = (xse)e∈Ex.
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Table 1 The Parameters of the ORDPDC.
G= (N,E) an undirected extended distribution grid with available upgrade options
U := U0 ∪Un a set of generators, indexed with l
U0 a set of existing generators
Un a set of generators that can be installed
i(l)∈N the bus in which the generator l ∈ U is located
Ui ⊆U the set of generators connected to bus i∈N
EV ⊆E a set of transformers
βe maximum flow variation allowed between different phases on line e∈EV
C ⊆ 2|E| a collection of a set of edges which forms a cycle with a distinct node set
Pe,Pi,Pl a set of phases on line e∈E, bus i∈N , and generator l ∈ U , respectively
T ke a thermal limit on line e∈E for phase k ∈Pe
V ki , V
k
i lower and upper bound on voltage magnitude at bus i∈N on phase k ∈Pi
Ze =Re + i Xe phase impedance matrix of line e∈E
L⊆N a set of buses with critical loads
Dki,p + i D
k
i,q complex power demand at bus i∈N on phase k ∈Pi
ηc, ηt resiliency criteria in percentage for critical and total loads respectively
gkl,p + i g
k
l,q complex power generation capacity of generator l ∈ U on phase k ∈Pl
G˜= (N˜ , E˜) an extended associated communication network with potential upgrade options
N˜c := N˜t ∪ N˜u
N˜t ⊆ N˜ a set of control points for switches
N˜u ⊆ N˜ a set of control points for generators
i˜(e)∈ N˜t, i˜(l)∈ N˜u the control point in G˜ of a switch e∈ Et and a generator l ∈ U , respectively
i˜d ∈ N˜ an artificial dummy node in G˜
G = (N ,E) the integrated system of G and G˜
Ex := E0x ∪Enx
E0x ⊆E a set of existing lines and links
Enx ⊆E a set of lines and links that can be installed
Et := E0t ∪Ent
E0t ⊆E a set of lines in which a switch is installed
Ent ⊆E a set of lines in which a switch can be installed
Eh ⊆E a set of lines or links that can be hardened
cxe installation cost of e∈ Enx
cte installation cost of switch on e∈ Ent
che line hardening cost of e∈ Eh
cul installation cost of l ∈ Un on the corresponding bus
D a collection of sets of damaged lines for each scenario, indexed with S := {1, · · · , |D|}
The presentation uses w = (xEnx , tEnt , hEh, uUn) to denote upgrade profiles, m the dimen-
sion of w, c= (cxEnx , c
t
Ent , c
h
Eh, c
u
Un) ∈Rm the cost vector, and ws = (xsEnx , tsEnt , hsEh , usUn) feasible
upgrade profiles for each scenario s ∈ S. For each s ∈ S, Q(s) denotes the set of upgrade
profiles that enable the grid to maintain the predetermined load satisfaction (resiliency)
level ηc, ηt (e.g., ηc = 0.98 and ηt = 0.5) under disaster scenario s.
With these notations, the ORDPDC is formulated as follows:
(P ) min cTw (1a)
s.t. w≥ws, ∀s∈ S, (1b)
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Table 2 The Variables of the ORDPDC.
Binary variables
xe 1 if e∈ Enx is built
te 1 if a switch is built on e∈ Ent
he 1 if e∈ Eh is hardened
ul 1 if a generator l ∈ Un is built.
For each disaster scenario s∈ S,
zse 1 if e∈ E is active during s
xse 1 if e∈ Ex exists during s
tse 1 if a switch on e is used or not during s
hse 1 if e∈ Eh is hardened during s
usl 1 if a generator l ∈ Un is available during s
yse 1 if i, j ∈N can be disconnected, for e= (i, j)∈C, C ∈ C, during s
be 1 if the real power on line e= (i, j)∈E flows from j to i during s
b′e 1 if the reactive power on line e= (i, j)∈E flows from j to i during s
Continuous variables
For each disaster scenario s∈ S,
ds,ki = d
s,k
i,p + i d
s,k
i,q amount of power delivered at bus i∈N on phase k ∈Pi during s
gs,kl = g
s,k
l,p + i g
s,k
l,q amount of power generation of l ∈ U on phase k ∈Pl during s
ss,ke,i = p
s,k
e,i + i q
s,k
e,i power flow on i-end of line e∈E, where i∈ δ(e), on phase k ∈Pe during s
V s,ki complex voltage at bus i∈N on phase k ∈Pi during s
Is,ke complex current on line e∈E on phase k ∈Pe during s
vs,ki squared voltage magnitude at bus i∈N on phase k ∈Pi during s
f se the amount of artificial flow on e∈ E˜ during s
γs
i˜
indicator of connectivity of control point i˜∈ N˜ to some control center during s
ws ∈Q(s), ∀s∈ S, (1c)
w ∈ {0,1}m.
Problem (P ) tries to find the optimal upgrade profile w∗ = (x∗Enx , t
∗
Ent , h
∗
Eh , u
∗
Un) that ensures
resilient operations for each disaster scenario. Equation (1b) ensures that an upgrade profile
is feasible if it dominates a feasible solution ws ∈Q(s) for each scenario s, i.e., if the grid
survives each of the extreme events in S.
The set Q(s) is specified by resiliency constraints that are expressed in terms of the AC
power flow equations, load satisfaction requirements, the communication network, and the
grid topology:
Q(s) = {ws ∈ {0,1}m : (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6)}
where Constraints (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) are stated in detail in the following. The
variables in each Q(s) are indexed by s. For simplicity, this section omits index s.
3.1.1. Power Flow Constraints Figure 2 specifies the power flow equations and sum-
marizes some of the notations. Let P = {a, b, c} denote the three phases of the network.
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Figure 2 Notations for the Power Flow Equations.
For each bus i ∈N , define Vi = (V ki )k∈Pi and, for each line e ∈E, define Ie = (Ike )k∈Pe and
se,i = (s
k
e,i)k∈Pe. The notations also use a superscript P ′ ⊆P to represent the projection or
the extension of a vector to the space of P ′. For example, if Pi = {a, b, c} and P ′ = {a, b},
then V P
′
i =
(
V ai , V
b
i
)T
. If Pi = {a, c} and P ′ = {a, b, c}, then V P ′i = (V ai ,0, V ci )T .
For each line e = (i, j) ∈ E, Ohm’s law for 3-phase lines states the relationship V Pej =
V Pei −ZeIe between Ie, Vi, and Vj. For each line e∈E and bus i∈ δ(e), the electric power
flow equation se,i = diag(V
Pe
i I
H
e ) describes the relationship between se,i, V
Pe
i , and Ie, where
superscript H indicates the conjugate transpose. In Figure 2, the big-M method is used
in Equations (2a) to apply Ohm’s law only for available lines; the big-M can be set as
maxj′∈{i,j},k∈Pe V
k
j′ −minj′∈{i,j},k∈Pe V kj′. Equations (2c) is the balance equation for power
flow at each bus i∈N , i.e., the sum of incoming flows equals the sum of the outgoing flows.
Let pe,i + iqe,i be the rectangular representation of se,i, where pe,i = (p
k
e,i)k∈Pi and qe,i =
(qke,i)k∈Pi denote the real and reactive power at the i-end of line e. Equations (2d) and (2e)
specify the thermal limits on lines and the voltage bounds on buses.
In some disaster scenarios when some of the lines are broken, power flows of different
phases on the same line can have opposite directions, which is a very undesirable opera-
tionally. Equations (2f) and (2g) prevent this behavior from happening.
The real and reactive power on different phase must stay within a certain limit. Let
p̂e,i =
∑
k˜∈Pe p
k˜
e,i and q̂e,i =
∑
k˜∈Pe q
k˜
e,i. Then, these limits are formulated as follows:(
β
e
(1− be) +βebe
) p̂e,i
|Pe| ≤ p
k
e,i ≤
(
β
e
be +βe(1− be)
) p̂e,i
|Pe| , ∀e∈EV , k ∈Pe, (3a)(
β
e
(1− b′e) +βeb′e
) q̂e,i
|Pe| ≤ q
k
e,i ≤
(
β
e
b′e +βe(1− b′e)
) q̂e,i
|Pe| , ∀e∈EV , k ∈Pe, (3b)
where β
e
= 1−βe and βe = 1 +β2.
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Figure 3 The Single-Commodity Flow Model for G˜ (red-colored squares denote control centers).
3.1.2. Generator/resiliency Constraints Moreover, each generator l ∈ U has its own
capacity and at least some percentage of critical and total loads must be satisfied as
specified by the resiliency criteria ηc and ηt.
0≤ gkl,p ≤ gkl,pul, gkl,q ≤ gkl,qul, ∀l ∈ U , k ∈Pl, (4a)
0≤ dki,p ≤Dki,p, 0≤ dki,q ≤Dki,q, ∀i∈N,k ∈Pi (4b)∑
i∈L
dki,p ≥ ηc
∑
i∈L
Dki,p,
∑
i∈L
dki,q ≥ ηc
∑
i∈L
Dki,q, ∀k ∈P, (4c)∑
i∈N
dki,p ≥ ηt
∑
i∈N
Dki,p,
∑
i∈N
dki,q ≥ ηt
∑
i∈N
Dki,q, ∀k ∈P. (4d)
Equation (4a) captures the power generation capacity constraints. Equation (4b) states
that the delivered power at each bus i should not exceed the load. Equations (4c)-(4d)
enforce the resiliency constraints.
3.1.3. Communication Constraints The operation of generators and RCSs depend on
the communication network: A generator l ∈ U and a RCS on line e∈ Et is operable only if
their associated control points i˜(l)∈ N˜ and i˜(e)∈ N˜ can receive a control signal from some
control centers through G˜. To capture the connectivity of a vertex to some control centers,
the formulation uses a single-commodity flow model summarized in Equations (5) in Figure
3. The formulation uses a dummy node i˜d to N˜ and connect i˜d to all control centers with
additional links. The flow f ∈R|E˜| originating from the dummy node i˜d then is used to check
the connectivity of every node. By Equation (5c), the flow passes only through available
links during disaster s (the big-M value is set to |N˜c| in the implementation). If a control
point i∈ N˜c is connected with some control center through some path, it can borrow a unit
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of flow from f to make γi 1, as specified in Equations (5a) and (5b). In other words, γi
indicates whether control point i∈ N˜c can receive a control signal. If γi is 1, the associated
device in G is operable by Equations (5d) and (5e).
Some communication network may be affected by a failure in distribution grid, e.g.,
when the grid fails to supply power to communication centers. This kind of dependencies
is not considered in this paper but it can be easily captured if needed. Indeed, first assign
a small critical load to each communication center and add constraints that restrict the
auxiliary arcs between the dummy node and each communication center to have positive
flow only when the associated communication center has a positive power supply. The
constraints can be expressed in terms of an extra binary variable for each bus at which a
communication center is located. The extra binary variable determines if there is a positive
power supply to the communication center.
3.1.4. Topological constraints. The final set of constraints captures the topology
restrictions in distribution systems:
xe ≥ te, ∀e∈ E , (6a)
ze = xe− te, ∀e∈ E , (6b)
xe = he, ∀e∈Ds, (6c)∑
e∈C
ye ≤ |C| − 1, ∀C ∈ C, (6d)
zeˆ ≤ ye, ∀eˆ∈E : δ(eˆ) = δ(e), e∈C, C ∈ C. (6e)
Constraint (6a) restrict switches to be operable only on existing lines. In Equation (6b),
ze represents whether line e ∈ E is active under scenario s. A line is active when it exists
and its switch is off. Equation (6c) states that a damaged line during scenario s ∈ S is
inoperable unless it is hardened. Constraints (6d) and (6e) ensures that the distribution
grid should operate in a radial manner. Accordingly, Constraint (6d) eliminates the sub-
tours within C. Since G is usually sparse, the implementation enumerates all the sub-tours
C and variable ye indicates whether i, j ∈ δ(e) are disconnected. If they are disconnected,
then all the lines between i and j are inactive by Constraint (6e).
Note also that, for existing lines not damaged under scenario s, xe is fixed as one. For
each line e ∈ E \ Et, te is set to zero. Finally, for each line e ∈ E \ Eh, he is fixed as 0
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and all the existing generators have ul = 1. This paper assumes perfect hardening, i.e., a
hardened line survives all disaster scenarios. This assumption can be naturally generalized
to imperfect hardening (Yamangil et al. 2015).
4. Linearization of the ORDPDC
The formulation of the ORDPDC is nonlinear. This section discusses how to obtain an
accurate linearization.
4.1. Linear Approximation of the AC Power Flow Equations for Radial Networks
The main difficulty lies in linearizing constraints (2a–2b) for which the formulation uses
the tight linearization from Gan and Low (2014). The linearization is based on two assump-
tions: (A1) line losses are small, i.e., ZeIeI
H
e ≈ 0 for e = (i, j) ∈ E and (A2) voltages are
nearly balanced, i.e., if Pi = {a, b, c}, then V ai /V bi ≈ V bi /V ci ≈ V ci /V ai ≈ ei2pi/3. Informally
speaking, the approximation generalizes the distflow equations to 3 phases, drops the
quadratic terms, and eliminates the current variables using the balance assumption. The
derivation assumes that all phases are well-defined for simplicity. Moreover, if A is an n×n
matrix, then diag(A) denotes the n-dimensional vector that represents its diagonal entries.
If a is an n-dimensional vector, then diag(a) denotes the n×n matrix with a in its diagonal
entries and zero for the off-diagonal entries.
Let si =
∑
l∈Ui gl − di denote the power injection at bus i. By (A1), se,i = se,j for all
e∈ (i, j)∈E and therefore, given si, se,i (i∈ δ(e)) is uniquely determined by Equation (2c).
Now define Se,i := ViI
H
e , whose diagonal entries are se,i. Multipling both sides of Vj =
Vi−ZeIe with their conjugate transposes gives
VjV
H
j = ViV
H
i −Se,iZHe −ZeSHe,i +ZeIeIHe ZHe . (7)
By assumption (A1), this becomes
VjV
H
j = ViV
H
i −Se,iZHe −ZeSHe,i (8)
and, by restricting attention to diagonal elements only,
vj = vi−diag(Se,iZHe −ZeSHe,i). (9)
where (vki )k∈Pi = diag(ViV
H
i ) represents the squared voltage magnitude at bus i∈N .
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Figure 4 The Piecewise-Linear Inner Approximation of a Circle.
By (A2), we have Se,i ≈ γPediag(se,i), where
γ =

1 α2 α
α 1 α2
α2 α 1
 and α= e−i2pi/3.
As a result, Equation (9) can now be simplified as follows: for each line e = (i, j) ∈ E
and k ∈Pe,
vki = v
k
j −
∑
k′∈Pe
2
[
(αnk−nk′Re)kk
′
pk
′
e,i + (α
nk−nk′Xe)kk
′
qk
′
e,i
]
, (10)
where na = 2, nb = 1, nc = 0, Re + iXe = Ze, and superscript kk
′ of a matrix denotes its
(k, k′)-entry.
In summary, Ohm’s law and the power flow equation in Constraints (2a) and (2b)
are approximated by Eq. (10) for all e = (i, j) ∈ E and k ∈ Pe and the big-M is set to
maxj′=i,j(V j′,k)
2−minj′=i,j(V j′,k)2, along with Equation (2c). Accordingly, Constraint (2e)
is replaced by the following constraint:
(V ki )
2 ≤ vki ≤ (V ki )2, ∀i∈N,k ∈Pi.
4.2. Linearization of (3a)-(3b)
Constraints (3a) and (3b) contain products of a binary variable and a bounded real variable.
These constraints are linearized without loss of accuracy using McCormick inequalities
McCormick (1976).
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4.3. Piecewise-Linear Inner Approximation of Thermal Limits
The quadratic thermal limit constraints (Constraint (2d)) can be approximated with K
linear inequalities as shown in Figure 4. The resulting inequalities are as follows: for all
e∈E, i∈ δ(e), k ∈Pe:(
sin
(
2npi
K
)
− sin
(
2(n− 1)pi
K
))
pke,i
−
(
cos
(
2npi
K
)
− cos
(
2(n− 1)pi
K
))
qke,i ≤ sin
(
2pi
K
)
Te,k, ∀n= 1, · · · ,K, (11a)
−Mzse ≤ pke,i ≤Mzse , −Mzse ≤ qke,i ≤Mzse , ∀e∈E,k ∈Pe. (11b)
where the big-M is set to
∑
i∈N D
p
i,k. Our implementation uses K = 28.
5. Scenario-Based Decomposition
In Section 9, the branch and price algorithm presented in the next section is compared to
the Scenario-Based Decomposition (SBD) algorithm proposed by Nagarajan et al. (2016).
SBD iteratively solves a master problem P (S ′) which only includes the constraints of a
subset of scenarios S ′ ⊆ S. The algorithm terminates when the optimal solution to P (S ′)
is feasible (and hence optimal) for the remaining scenarios S \ S ′. Otherwise, at least one
scenario s∈ S \S ′ is infeasible. Scenario s is added to S ′ and the process is repeated.
6. The Branch-and-Price Algorithm
This paper proposes a branch-and-price (B&P) algorithm for the ORDPDC. The B&P
exploits the special structure of the ORDPDC in several ways. First, it uses a compact
reformulation that yields a better lower bound than the LP relaxation. The reformulation
also makes it possible to use column generation and solve independent pricing problems
associated with each scenario in parallel. Finally, several additional techniques are used to
accelarate the column generation significantly. Section 6.1 presents the problem reformu-
lation and Section 6.2 briefly reviews the basic column generation of the B&P algorithm.
Section 6.3 introduces several acceleration schemes. The implementation of the B&P algo-
rithm is presented in Section 6.4.
6.1. The Problem Reformulation
Letting Q˜(s) be the linearization of Q(s), the problem (P ) is rewritten as
(P ) min cTw
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s.t. w−ws ≥ 0, ∀s∈ S, (12a)
ws ∈ Q˜(s), ∀s∈ S, (12b)
ws ∈ {0,1}m, ∀s∈ S. (12c)
Without the linking constraint (12a), (P ) can be decomposed into |S| independent prob-
lems, each of which has a feasible region defined by
Ps = {ws ∈Rm : (12b) and (12c)} , ∀s∈ S.
Observe that Ps is bounded and let J s = {wˆsj ∈Rm : wˆsj is a vertex of conv(Ps)} be the set
of all vertices of conv(Ps). Letting J =∪sJs, consider the following problem:
(P˜ ) min cTw
s.t. w −
∑
j∈J s
λsjwˆ
s
j ≥ 0, ∀s∈ S, (13a)∑
j∈J s
λsj = 1, ∀s∈ S, (13b)
w ∈ {0,1}m, (13c)
λsj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈J s, s∈ S. (13d)
Theorem 1. (P ) and (P˜ ) are equivalent.
Proof. Since (P ) and (P˜ ) have the same objective function, it suffices to show that (P )
has an optimal solution that is feasible to (P˜ ) and vice versa. Let (w¯,{w¯s}s∈S) be the
optimal solution of (P ). By the Farkas-Minkowski-Weyl theorem (Schrijver 1998), w¯s can
be expressed as a convex combination of some extreme points in J s, for each s∈ S. Hence,
we can construct a feasible solution of (P˜ ) from (w¯,{w¯s}s∈S).
Consider now an optimal solution of (P˜ ), (w¯′,{λ¯s′j }j∈J s for s ∈ S). By (13a), if λ¯s′j > 0
for j ∈ J s, wˆsj is dominated by w¯′. Therefore, it is possible to construct another optimal
solution to (P˜ ) by choosing a single j∗ for which λ¯s′j∗ > 0 for each s∈ S, setting λ¯s′j∗ to one
and setting the other λ¯s′j to zero. By definition of Js, the constructed optimal solution is
feasible for (P ). 
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This paper uses a branch-and-price algorithm to solve (P˜ ). Let LPP˜ denote the LP relax-
ation of (P˜ ). Since the feasible region of (P˜ ) is the intersection of the convex hulls of each
subproblem, LPP˜ yields a stronger lower bound than the LP relaxation of (P ).
6.2. The Basic Branch and Price
The B&P algorithm uses a restricted master problem (M) with a subset of columns of (P˜ )
and |S| independent subproblems (Ps) for s ∈ S, instead of handling LPP˜ globally. The
column generation starts with an initial basis that consists of the first-stage variables w, a
column associated with a feasible solution for each subproblem, and some slack variables.
Let J˜ s be the corresponding subset of J s. The restricted mater problem (M) is as follows:
(M) min cTw
s.t. w−
∑
j∈J˜ s
λsjwˆ
s
j ≥ 0, ∀s∈ S, (14a)
∑
j∈J˜ s
λsj = 1, ∀s∈ S, (14b)
w≥ 0, (14c)
λsj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ J˜ s, ∀s∈ S. (14d)
and the pricing problem for scenario s is specified as follows:
(Ps) min −σ¯s + y¯sT ws
s.t. ws ∈ Q˜(s),
ws ∈ {0,1}m,
where, for a scenario s, y¯s is the dual solution for constraints (14a) and σ¯s is the dual
solution of the convexity constraint (14b).
6.3. Acceleration Schemes
The performance of column generation deteriorates when the master problem exhibits
degeneracy, leading to multiple dual solutions which may significantly influence the qual-
ity of columns generated by the pricing problem. The master problem (M) suffers from
degeneracy, especially early in the column-generation process. Initially, (M) has (m+1)|S|
constraints, m columns corresponding to the first-stage variables w, and |S| columns for the
second-stage variables {λs}s∈S . Therefore, in early iterations, linear solvers have a natural
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tendency to select m(|S| − 1) columns from the slack variables in Constraints (14a). For
example, assume that the slack variable is in basis for the constraint involving a non-basic
first-stage variable wk and a scenario s in Constraints (14a). By complementary slack-
ness, this implies that the dual variable is zero. Consider a vertex wˆs whose k-th entry is
non-zero. The value y¯skw
s
k is zero in the pricing problem. However, for this vertex to enter
the basis, it must incur the cost ck of wk, which is ignored in the pricing subproblem. As
a result, subproblem (Ps) prices many columns too optimistically and generates columns
that do not improve the current objective value, resulting in a large number of iterations.
6.3.1. Pessimistic Reduced Cost In order to overcome the poor pricing of columns,
this section first proposes a pessimistic pricing scheme that selects more meaningful
columns in early iterations. Consider a solution ws to the pricing problem. If wsk = 1 but
the first-stage variable wk is not in basis, then by the relevant constraint from (14a), the
variable λsj corresponding to w
s can only enter in the basis at 1 if wk is also in the basis
at 1. As a result, the pessimistic pricing scheme adds the reduced cost ck−
∑
s∈S y¯
s
k to the
pricing objective, which becomes
−σ¯s + (y¯s)Tws +
∑
k∈η
(ck−
∑
s∈S
y¯sk)w
s
k
where η is the set of non-basic first-stage variables, i.e., η = {k | wk is non-basic}. Note
that column generation with this pessimistic pricing subproblem is not guaranteed to con-
verge to the optimal linear relaxation. Hence, the implementation switches to the standard
pricing problem in later iterations.
6.3.2. Optimality Cut A solution to the master problem (M) where the first-stage
variables take integer value gives an upper bound to the optimal solution. The B&P algo-
rithm periodically solves the integer version of (M) to obtain its objective value v¯(M).
The constraint
cTws ≤ v¯(M)
can then be added to the pricing subproblem for scenario s since any solution violating
this constraint is necessarily suboptimal. As shown later on, this optimal cut is critical to
link the two phases of the column generation, preventing many potential columns to be
generated in the second phase.
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6.3.3. A Lexicographic Objective for Pricing Subproblems In general, sparse
columns are more likely to enter the basis in the master problem (M). As a result, the B&P
algorithm uses a lexicographic objective in the pricing subproblem. First, it minimizes the
(pessimistic or standard) reduced cost. Then it maximizes sparsity by minimizing 1Tws
subject to the constraint that the reduced cost must be equal to the optimal objective
value of the first stage.
6.4. The Final Branch and Price Implementation
6.4.1. Column Generation The column generation starts with an initial basis built
from the optimal solutions of each subproblems under the objective function of cTws. It
then proceeds with two phases of column generation, first using the pessimistic reduced
cost and then switching to the standard one.
The second phase terminates when the optimality gap becomes lower than the predeter-
mined tolerance, e.g., 0.1%. The lower bound is based on Lagrangian relaxation. Given a
pair w¯ and (y¯, σ¯) of optimal primal and dual solutions for (M), the Lagrangian relaxation
is given by
L(w¯, y¯, σ¯) = cT w¯+
∑
s∈S
Os(y¯, σ¯)
where Os(y¯, σ¯) is the optimal solution of the pricing problem for scenario s under dual
variables (y¯, σ¯). The first phase uses the same technique for termination, although the
resulting formula is no longer guaranteed to be a lower bound. Once the gap between the
upper bound and the “approximate” lower bound is smaller than the tolerance, the column
generation process moves to the second phase.
The column generation also avoids generating dominated columns. Assume that [ws1 =
1,ws2 = 1] is a feasible solution of (Ps) and the corresponding column has been added to the
master problem (M). Then, there is no need to consider a solution [ws1 = 1,w
s
2 = 1,w
s
3 = 1].
The column generation adds the constraint of ws1 +w
s
2 ≤ 1 to (Ps) when such a dominated
solution is produced and does not include it in the master problem.
6.4.2. The Branch and Bound After convergence of the column generation to LPP˜ ,
the branch and bound algorithm solves the restricted master problem (M) with the integral
condition w ∈ {0,1}m to obtain a strong primal bound. In general, this incumbent solution
is of very high quality and the average optimality gap is 0.19%. Therefore, the branch and
price algorithm uses a depth-first branch and bound. Moreover, at each branching node,
it selects the variable that minimizes the optimality gap.
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7. Description of the Data Sets
This section describes the distribution test systems. The data set is available from
https://github.com/lanl-ansi/micot/ in the application_data/lpnorm directory.
Details of the data format are available from https://github.com/lanl-ansi/micot/
wiki/Resilient-Design-Executable.
The first two sets, the Rural and Urban systems, is from Yamangil et al. (2015). They are
based on the IEEE 34 bus system (Kersting 1991) (see Figure 5) and replicate the 34-bus
distribution feeder three times. All three feeders are connected to a single transmission bus
and candidate new lines were added to the network to allow back-feeds. In the rural model,
the distribution feeder was geolocated to model feeders with long distances between nodes.
Similarly, the urban network was geolocated to model compact feeders typical of urban
environments. Geolocation of these networks has the net effect of adjusting the lengths
of the power lines and their associated impedance values. Spreading the network out also
increases the hardening and new line costs. As a result, the rural system is expected to
favor solutions with distributed generation and the urban system solutions with new lines
and switches (in addition to hardening lines). The fixed cost of installing a new distributed
generator is set at $500k. The cost of a distributed generator is set at $1,500k per MW
based on the 2025 projections from U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014). The
cost of installing new switches for 3-phase lines is set between 10k and 50k (Bialek 2014).
The cost of new underground 3-phase lines is set at about $500k per mile and the cost
of new underground single phase lines is set at about $100k per mile. The hardening cost
was set at roughly $50k and $10k per mile for multi-phase and single-phase lines (State
of Virginia Corporation Commission 2005). The third network, network123, is based on
the 123-node network of Kersting (1991). This network was unaltered except for adding
new line candidates and labeling large loads as critical.
The communication network G˜ is built to conform to G. Let G′ = (N ′,E′) be the dupli-
cate of G. For each generator l ∈ U , its duplicate i(l) represents its control point. Consider
E ′t ⊆ E ′, the duplicate of Et. To represent the control point for a switch, e ∈ E ′t is divided
in the middle and a new vertex ve is added to represent the control point for the switch.
In other words, the edge e= (eh, et)∈ E ′t is replaced by a new vertex ve and two new edges
e1 = (eh, ve), e2 = (ve, et). The test cases assume that the damage, installation, and hard-
ening of a line in G are also incurred for the corresponding line in G˜. These assumptions
can be easily generalized without changing the nature of the model.
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(a) Urban (b) Rural
Figure 5 The urban and rural distribution systems which contain three copies of the IEEE 34 system to mimic
situations where there are three normally independent distribution circuits that support each other
during extreme events. These test cases include 109 nodes, 118 generators, 204 loads, and 148 edges.
The experimental evaluation considers 100 scenarios per damage intensity for all three
networks and the damage intensities are taken in the set {1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 10%, 15%,
20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 45%, 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, 90%, 95%,
100%}. The scenario generation procedure is based on damage caused by ice storms. The
intensity tends to be homogeneous on the scale of distribution systems (Sa 2002). Ice storm
intensity is modeled as a per-mile damage probability, i.e. the probability at least one pole
fails in a one mile segment of power line. Each line is segmented into 1-mile segments and a
scenario is generated by randomly failing each segment with the specified probability. This
probability is normalized for any line segment shorter than 1 mile. A line is “damaged” if
any segment fails.
8. Case Study
This section analyzes the behavior of the optimization model on a variety of test cases. In
particular, it studies how the topology of the distribution grid and the dispersion level of its
communication network affect the optimal design. For each network described in Section
7, this section analyzes the optimal design under different settings of damage probability,
the resiliency level, and the number of communication centers. The default value of ηc and
ηt are 98% and 50% respectively, the default number of communication centers is 4, and
the phase variation parameter β is set to 15% for EV and ∞ otherwise. Unless specified
otherwise, the comparisons are based on these default values.
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(a) Rural network (b) Urban network
(c) Network123
Figure 6 Statistics on the Optimal Grid Designs.
8.1. Impact of grid topology
Let nh, nx, nt, and nu be the number of hardened lines, new lines, new switches, and new
generators in the optimal design. Figure 6 reports these values for various damage levels
and the three networks. The red line indicates the optimal upgrade costs, and the counts
of the upgrade options are represented as a bar. The results show that hardening lines is
the major component of each optimal design and that its share increases with the disaster
intensity. The results also show that DGs are used in significant numbers in the rural
network, while new lines and switches complement hardening in the urban model. This
was expected given the length of the lines in these two networks. The third network only
needs line hardenings.
8.2. Impact of the Communication Network
First note that ignoring the communication network is equivalent to assuming that every
bus has its own communication center. In the following, G˜(k) denotes a communication
network with k centers and G˜(∞) the case where each bus has a center.
Figure 9 and Table 3 report the impact of the communication system: They report
optimal objective values and solution statistics under various numbers of communication
centers. Fewer communication centers lead to significant cost increases in the rural network,
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(a) Rural network (b) Urban network
Figure 7 Optimal Designs of the Rural and Urban Networks (3% damage level).
Figure 8 Optimal Design of Network network123 (20% damage level).
but have limited effect on the urban network and network123. In the rural network,
resiliency comes from forming microgrids with DGs, which require their own communica-
tion centers. When these are not available, optimal designs harden existing lines and build
new lines and switches, which are more costly as substantiated in Table 3.
Figure 10 illustrates the resulting designs on the rural network for scenarios with a dam-
age level of 3%. The top row depicts some of the scenarios and shows the affected lines. The
bottom row depicts the optimal designs for various configurations of the communication
network. For G˜(∞), the optimal design features three new DGs in the west-, north-, and
east-end of the network to meet the critical loads of each region. These regions are then
islanded under various scenarios. For G˜(4), the optimal design installs a new line linking
critical loads in the north side to the west side of the network, instead of using DG in
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(a) Rural network (b) Urban network (c) Network123
Figure 9 Cost Analysis For the Number of Communication Centers
Table 3 Impact of the Communication Network on Optimal
Grid Designs.
Comm. Network Obj. nh nx nt nu
Rural,
3%
damage
G˜(1) 2095.74 12 3 1 0
G˜(4) 1948.09 6 2 1 2
G˜(8) 1948.09 6 2 1 2
G˜(∞) 1914.99 5 1 0 3
the north side. This stems from Scenario 100 where a DG in the bus with critical loads
cannot be operated since it has no communication center. For G˜(1), scenario 1 prevents the
operation of an east-end DG and scenario 100 the operation of a west-end DG. Hence, the
optimal design only considers hardening and new lines and switches. On the other hand,
the urban network and Network123 achieve resiliency by increasing grid connectivity
for all communication networks.
9. Performance Analysis of the Branch and Price Algorithm
This section studies the performance of the B&P algorithm. All computations were imple-
mented with the C++/Gurobi 6.5.2 interface. They use a Haswell architecture compute
node configured with 24 cores (two twelve-core 2.5 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2680v3 processors)
and 128 GB RAM.
9.1. Computational Performance
Figure 11a reports the computation time of the B&P and SBD algorithms for all the
instances described in Section 7, where the reference line (in red) serves to delineate when
an algorithm is faster than the other. Their statistics are displayed in Figure 11b. In
average, the B&P algorithm is faster than the SBD algorithm by a factor of 3.25. These
figures also indicate that the SBD algorithm has a high degree of performance variance.
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(a) damage scenarios
(b) Optimal grid design
Figure 10 Optimal Designs of the Rural Network under 3% Damage and Various Communication Network
Configurations.
This comes from the nature of the scenario set S. If S contains a dominating scenario
and the scenario has low index in S, then the SBD algorithm solves the problem quickly.
Otherwise, the SBD may need a large number of iterations and the MIP model keeps
growing in size with each iteration. For 2 out of 1120 instances, the SBD algorithm times
out (wallclock time limit of 4 hours). On the other hand, the B&P algorithm is stable
across all instances. The B&P algorithm also has the additional benefit that it produces
improving feasible solutions continuously. In contrast, the SBD algorithm only produces a
feasible solution at optimality. Finally, the B&P algorithm appears more stable numerically
than the SBD algorithm. For 5 out of 1120 instances, the B&P algorithm yields a better
optimal solution than the SBD algorithm as shown in Table 4. Each such solution was
validated for feasibility.
9.2. Solution Quality at the Root Node.
The problem reformulation produces a strong lower bound and the majority of the instances
are proven optimal at the root node. Table 5 summarizes the average number of branching
nodes and the average optimality gap at the root node.
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(a) Computation Times (b) Average Computation Times and 95% Confi-
dence Intervals
Figure 11 Comparison of Computation Times: SBD versus B&P.
Table 4 Numerical Stability of the B&P Algorithm.
Instance
Opt. obj.val
SBD B&P Gap
Rural, 30% damage, ηt = 0.5, G˜(4) 2458.49 2453.79 -0.19 %
Rural, 30% damage, ηt = 0.6, G˜(4) 2458.49 2453.79 -0.19 %
Rural, 30% damage, ηt = 0.7, G˜(4) 2524.68 2519.98 -0.19 %
Rural, 30% damage, ηt = 0.8, G˜(4) 2572.31 2567.60 -0.19 %
Network123, 55% damage, ηt = 0.8, G˜(8) 232.48 227.27 -2.24 %
Table 5 Branching Tree Statistics.
Avg. # of branching nodes Avg. opt. gap at the root node
1.8 0.19 %
9.3. Benefits of the Accelerating Schemes
To highlight its design choices, the B&P algorithm is compared to a column generation
with dual stabilization (Du Merle et al. 1999). In addition, the benefit of each of the
accelerating schemes is investigated independently by running the B&P algorithm without
the considered extension. We sample 90 instances by setting ηt = 0.5 and 0.8, and the
damage level to 5%, 30%, 65%, 85%, 100% for the three networks G˜(0), G˜(1), and G˜(4).
Dual stabilization prevents dual variables from fluctuating too much, which is often the
case in column generation. It tries to confine dual variables in a box that contains the
current best estimate of the optimal dual solution and penalizes solutions that deviate
from the box. See, for instance, Du Merle et al. (1999), Lu¨bbecke and Desrosiers (2005) for
details about stabilized column generation. Our implementation updates the box whenever
the Lagrangian lower bound is updated.
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Table 6 Comparison to a Column Generation with Dual Stabilization.
Avg. computation time (sec) Avg. number of iterations
B&PB 12857.97
† 3122.57†
B&PS 11563.44
† 1514.58†
B&P 488.03 96.12
Table 6 summarizes the computational performance of the stabilized column generation
in comparison with the B&P algorithm. B&PB denotes the branch-and-price algorithm
with the basic scheme only (Section 6.2) and B&PS stands for the branch and price algo-
rithm with dual stabilization. The symbol † is used to denote that the algorithm reaches the
wallclock time limit for some instances. For more than one third of the sampled instances,
B&PB and B&PS exceed the wallclock time limit. For instances where both algorithms ter-
minate within the time limit, B&PS is faster than B&PB by a factor of around 4. Although
the dual stabilization does improve the computation time of the basic algorithm, it is still
not adequate to solve the ORDPDC practically. The B&P algorithm, on the other hand,
shortens computation times by a factor of 26.35.
The next results investigate the performance gain of each accelerating scheme by remov-
ing them one at a time from the B&P algorithm. Table 7 describes the computational
performance and Figure 12 illustrates the impact of each accelerating schemes on the con-
vergence rate of the rural network under 6% damage level. In the table and figure, R
denotes the revised reduced cost, C the optimality cut, O the lexicographic objective pric-
ing problem, B&P\k the B&P algorithm without scheme k, with k ∈ {R,C,O}, and CG\k
the column generation of B&P without scheme k.
The results in Table 7 indicate that all the accelerating schemes contribute to the com-
putational performance of the B&P algorithm. Figure 12a illustrates the key role of the
optimality cut. Without this cut, the second stage of the column generation which uses the
traditional pricing objective does not take advantage of the columns generated in the first
stage and its lower bound drastically drops. Figure 12b compares the convergence behavior
of CG and CG\R, showing that CG reaches the optimal objective value faster than CG\R.
Figure 12c highlights the impact of the lexicographic objective function and shows that it
significantly contributes to the fast convergence of the algorithm.
10. Conclusions
This paper proposed an expansion planning model to improve the resiliency of distribution
systems facing natural disasters. The planning model considers the hardening of existing
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Table 7 Benefits of the Accelerating Schemes.
Avg. computation time (sec) Avg. number of iterations
B&P 488.03 96.12
B&P\R 844.24 96.39
B&P\C 2589.55† 215.94†
B&P\O 2979.84† 544.65†
(a) Optimality cut (b) Revised reduced cost (c) lexicographic objective function
Figure 12 Comparison of Convergence Rates (rural network, 6% level of damage).
lines and the addition of new lines, switches, and distributed generators that would allow a
subpart of the system to operate as a microgrid. The expansion model uses a 3-phase model
of the distribution system. In addition, it also considers damages to the communication
system which may prevent generators and switches to be controlled remotely. The input
of the expansion model contains a set of damage scenarios, each of which specifying how
the disaster affects the distribution system.
The paper proposed a branch and price algorithm for this model where the pricing
subproblem generates new expansions for each damage scenario. The branch and price
uses a number of acceleration schemes to address significant degeneracy in the model.
They include a new pricing objective, an optimality cut, and a multi-objective function to
encourage sparsity in the generated expansions. The resulting branch and price algorithm
significantly improves the performance of a scenario-based decomposition algorithm and a
branch and price with a stabilized column generation. The case studies show that optimal
solutions strongly depend on the grid topology and the sophistication of the communication
network. In particular, the results highlight the importance of distributed generation for
rural networks, which necessitates a resilient communication system.
Byeon, Van Hentenryck, Bent, and Nagarajan: Communication-Constrained Expansion Planning
The acceleration techniques presented in this paper are not limited to the electricity
distribution grid planning problem; They can be used on problems with similar structure,
i.e, two-stage stochastic problems with feasibility recourse.
Future work will be devoted to applying and scaling these techniques to instances with
thousands of components.
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